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Keywords: Epistemic barrier, epistemic limit, agnosticism, knowledge, belief, belief acquisition. (1974) . And more contemporary ones include Fodor's proposal of endogenous constraints on concepts of human beings (Fodor, 1983 2 ), and Nagel's (1986),
McGinn's (1993) and Williamson's (2000) examinations of epistemic limits.
Many take for granted that there are epistemic limits. This paper will not take that for granted. It will rather attempt to show that there exist several kinds of barriers before human epistemological practices.
What bear more significance for the purpose of this paper, however, are the epistemic stances towards what is beyond our epistemic limits. Agnosticism, as one of the significant approaches, is recently claimed to be a sustainable stance towards epistemological barriers (Rosenkranz, 2007; Magnus, 2005) . The paper will attempt to show, as well, that agnostic stance cannot be taken in many cases, and it is not compatible with the nature of human epistemological activities.
Here is a detailed plan for this paper: I will first categorize parts of reality, and simply propose that reality divides into three domains with respect to by which method we investigate it. My categorization will postulate the notion of "epistemic barrier" as it primary basis in order to soning to answer these questions. And the answers you will acquire will be primarily based on rational grounds. We may call this part of reality 'the domain of rational facts.'
The last part of reality is the main target of this paper. It is that
which consists of what is beyond the empirical and rational facts. To explicate this part of reality, let us consider the notion of 'epistemic barrier,' first.
To begin with an example, think about space travel. It seems that human beings cannot gain all the knowledge there is of different sections of the universe, just because they cannot travel all sections of it in an adequately short duration. This is because of its enormous size. It is so huge that even in thousands of years this may never be possible at all. This is what the world outside brings us as a limitation against our entire capacity of acquiring knowledge. There are other limitations we face on this very same subject. We may never know all there is to know of different sections of the universe, also because of our limited lifespan, brain structure, neurophysiologic features etc.
The astronauts we send for space travel may never know certain laws governing those sections of the space, just because they are biologically limited. There is more to these limitations. On the same very point, we
should seriously consider our conceptual capacity as well. Our unlucky astronauts perhaps are not capable of completely conceiving certain concepts like infinity, unordinary spatiotemporal properties, backward causation in time etc. Unknown to them, this may be one of the serious obstacles they encounter in their exploration of the space. As a result, it is quite obvious that we are epistemologically limited beings, which basical- Even if we give some credit to this view, it seems that the epistemic agent still has to take one of the above stances-the agnostic or the nonempirical/non-rational stance. It is because her epistemic attitude towards what is beyond the barriers has nothing to do with how the human cognitive capacity would advance in the future. The epistemic agent's predicaments result from those limitations in his lifespan, and she has to develop an attitude while she still lives. She has to take a stance while she is still epistemologically suffering from her limits. Hoping that the future generations of her own kind will be able to exceed their limits in the far future would not obviously solve her predicaments during her life. If so, it is time to examine the mentioned two possible stances towards the third domain. As to the first one, the agnostic one, I claim that it is not possible to take such a stance in those cases where the epistemic agent is either forced to take an action or under the inevitable effects of emotional and sensual states, or when curiosity wins. I would like to examine these three situations under three scenarios:
Scenario 1 -Being forced to take an action: Suppose that one day the researchers in NASA detect an intergalactic radio signal from a distant galaxy, which they become certain that it is not a fake one: it really comes from that galaxy. Although the signal has a complex structure, the researchers finally decode a message embedded in it. Nevertheless, after examining the message, they are not only surprised but also quite shocked. For, the message exactly says "we will destroy the Earth." Well, this is just a thought experiment, but like most of the thought experiments, it is aimed to reveal our intuitions that we are not aware of in normal conditions. Now, it is clear that the researchers in NASA face several epistemic barriers one of which is the distance between the Earth and the galaxy from which they received the signal. Nonetheless, they have to form some beliefs on the origins of the message, the likely sender, the available data regarding that distant galaxy and so on. They have to do this because relevant authorities have to take an action; otherwise life on Earth might end. It seems that the researchers cannot be agnostic on such a scenario: They cannot say, for example, "it is implausible to form beliefs on something we do not have enough data to do so."
Scenario 2 -Facing Death: Think about Betty who is a full-fledged agnostic. For her, there is nothing to believe on what is beyond the epistemic barriers such as death. Suppose that Betty undergoes, very sadly, a lethal disease. She knows that she is going to die soon because of this deadly illness. Since her disease is not a mental one, nothing prevents her from rational thinking. So, she can perfectly undergo such processes of rational thinking that humans are mortal, that she is human, and that sooner or later she was going to die, so nothing to worry about and no revision is necessary in her belief system. Is this how Betty apt to think?
The answer is clearly "no." She will most probably begin to consider seri- It depends on one's epistemic stance indeed. If one is a normativist in epistemology, one must be talking about the former; but if one is a naturalist in epistemology, one must be talking about the latter. Here, the reader should be reminded of the chief concern of this paper. The primary goal of this paper has been to show that epistemic agents who appeal to other ways of forming beliefs on what is beyond the epistemic barriers cannot be judged carelessly that she presents implausible epistemic behaviors. Given this goal, the matter of determining a set of epistemic standards for the relevant purpose is beyond the scope of this paper.
What this paper aims to argue only requires showing that epistemic agents who appeal to the ways of forming beliefs other than the empirical or rational ones, in fact, employ certain epistemic standards either deliberately or unintentionally. This and the previous conclusion I reachedthat the empirical/rational methods or the agnostic stance are not options for an epistemic agent in forming beliefs on the third domain-will suffice for the final conclusion that beliefs gained by other ways cannot be judged ruthlessly that they are epistemologically groundless.
It seems that epistemic agents who appeal to other ways of forming beliefs employ two kinds of standards: internal and external. Internal standards are those which are imposed internally by the dynamics of the method adopted. External standards, on the other hand, are those by which the epistemic agent judges the beliefs externally to make sure that his beliefs are somehow connected to the other two domains-empirical and rational domains. To exemplify the usage of these standards, take
John who has believed for years in an eternal life after death. He accordingly believes that he will continue to live even after he dies. Clearly, he, or anyone else, cannot find an empirical support for such a belief. Nor can he construct a well-established rational basis for that belief. Nevertheless, he employs several epistemic standards in holding the belief of that sort.
Authenticity of the belief, how supported from the sources the belief is, the reliability of those sources and so on can be good examples of the internal standards. John, on the other hand, demands that his belief about Anahtar Kelimeler: Epistemik bariyer, epistemik limit, agnostisizm, bilgi, inanç, inanç edinimi.
